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Abstract
Health care may be similar to Sisyphus work: When the task is about to be completed, work has to start
all over again. To see the analogy, consider an initial decision to allocate more resources to health. The
likely consequence is an increased number of survivors, who will exert additional demand for health
care. With more resources allocated to health, the cycle starts over again. The objective of this paper is
to improve on earlier research that failed to find evidence of a Sisyphus syndrome in industrialized
countries. This time, there are signs of such a cycle, which however seems to have faded away recently.
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Abstract
Health care may be similar to Sisyphus work: When the task is about to be completed, work has
to start all over again. To see the analogy, consider an initial decision to allocate more resources to
health. The likely consequence is an increased number of survivors, who will exert additional demand
for health care. With more resources allocated to health, the cycle starts over again. The objective
of this paper is to improve on earlier research that failed to find evidence of a Sisyphus syndrome
in industrialized countries. This time, there are signs of such a cycle, which however seems to have
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1 Introduction and motivation
When the British National Health Service was created, its founders expected the problem of ill health to
fade away. After all, once people have access to good medical care, they should live healthy and happy
to the end of their lives. History has proven this expectation to be entirely false. Indeed, decision makers
in health policy are haunted by a quite different suspicion, which Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) dubbed the
Sisyphus syndrome. Health care services could be something like the work of Sisyphus, a Greek hero who
was ordered by the Gods to push a big rock uphill. But just before the very top, the rock would slip
from his hands so he had to start all over again.
Consider the following sequence of events in health care. Initially, politicians decide to allocate more
resources to health. If effective this intervention causes people that would have otherwise died to survive.
With more survivors around, there will be additional demand for health care services. To the extent
that this is financed out of private resources, there is not too much of a problem. Individuals will adjust
their health insurance policies accordingly and allocate a greater share of their income to health care.
However, most of these services are covered by public health insurance. Rather than accepting to pay
themselves, especially older voters have an incentive to get politicians to reallocate the public budget
in favor of health. The increase in health care expenditure (HCE ) again creates survivors. Thus, the
Sisyphus syndrome can go into its next turn.
For the Sisyphus syndrome to exist, two (possibly lagged) relationships must be operative.
1. Health care expenditure (HCE ) must have the effect of increasing remaining life expectancy (RLE ).
For policy, this effect is of particular importance if it occurs at retirement age because in systems
financed by a payroll tax, retired individuals do not contribute to the financing of health care
anymore. In tax-based systems, their contribution decreases to the extent that their income drops
after retirement.
2. Increasing RLE must translate (through a changed planning horizon and through an increased
number of survivors) into an impact on health care spending.
However, the second relationship is confounded in that lower rather than higher RLE is sometimes
associated with HCE. Evidence is accumulating that much of lifetime HCE is spent during the last year
before death [Lubitz and Riley (1993); Zweifel, Felder and Meier (1999)]. In this case, HCE does not
generate survivors that will spend more private HCE and exert pressure for more public HCE in the
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future. At the macroeconomic level, the share of the population that is in their last year of life is reflected
by the mortality rate. A high mortality rate (which itself may depend on previous HCE ) is associated
with high HCE in the current period while mitigating the dynamics of the Sisyphus syndrome.
As to relationship (1), Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) found that prior HCE in OECD countries did
increase RLE at ages 40 and 65. But with regard to relationship (2), they were not able to establish a
statistical link between RLE and either public or private HCE. The dampening effect of mortality was
not accounted for. In all, a Sisyphus syndrome could not be said to exist.
The objective of this contribution is to revisit these findings. In the light of improved specification,
data, and econometric methodology, what can be said about the effect of HCE on RLE, especially at
higher ages? Is it still true that no evidence can be found of a feedback, from increased RLE to HCE?
And is it necessary to control for the mortality rate? Accordingly, the plan of this contribution is follows.
In section 2, a review of the relevant literature is provided, followed by a more precise restatement of
the Sisyphus syndrome. Section 3 is devoted to econometric specification, a description of the data base,
and variable definitions. The new empirical evidence is presented in section 4, while section 5 contains a
summary and conclusion.
2 Survey of the literature
2.1 The production of health
The seminal article continues to be Auster, Leveson and Sarachek (1969), who related age- and sex-
adjusted mortality rates of U.S. states to medical care inputs, schooling, income, and environmental
variables. Schooling was negatively related to mortality, medical care inputs not consistently so, while
higher income tended to cause an increase in mortality. Hadley (1982) refined this approach, using county
groups as unit of analysis. Again, education was negatively related to mortality, income negatively to
infant mortality but in mixed ways to adult mortality. A new finding is that most age-sex specific
mortality rates depend negatively on medical care spending, with an elasticity of -0.15. Focusing on the
elderly, Hadley (1988) found elasticities in the -0.25 to -0.44 range.
An early international study of the production of health is the one by Stewart (1971). Using the
nations of the Western hemisphere in the mid-1960s as the unit of analysis, he related life expectancy at
birth to medical inputs, literacy rates, and the availability of potable water. All three inputs had small
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marginal effects in the case of the United States, whereas literacy and potable water showed significant
effects in the less developed countries of the group.
Cochrane, St. Leger and Moore (1978) based their analysis on a cross-section of 18 developed countries
as of 1970. In their correlation analysis, a greater number of physicians goes along with higher rather than
lower mortality (with no attempt to control for reverse causation). Mortality rates correlate negatively
with income per capita, suggesting that the positive effect found by Auster et al. (1969) might be limited
to the United States. They also tested the effects of cigarette and alcohol consumption, with mixed
effects. The ambiguous role of income may be due to failure to account for unfavorable life styles that
accompany the achievement of higher (labor) income. This is the conclusion that can be drawn from
Gerdtham and Ruhm (2004), who find that out of 9 specific causes of mortality in OECD countries, 6 tend
to be negatively related to income, while mortality from heart disease displays a strong and significantly
positive relationship. At the same time, there is evidence in 5 out of 9 cases that a higher degree of
demand pressure in the economy (proxied by a lower unemployment rate) may drive up mortality rates.
Working with a 1980 cross section of OECD countries, Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) introduced lagged
HCE (the lag being 10 years due to data availability) as an explanatory variable on the grounds that
earlier medical interventions have assured the survival of individuals that make up the current population.
Also they replaced mortality by remaining life expectancy (at ages 40 and 65) to better represent the
planning situation of forward-looking individuals. Lagged HCE proved significant, with an elasticity (at
the mean) of 0.15.
More recently Frech III. and Miller (1999) review research performed by noneconomists (focused
on low-income countries), which tends to support the notion that literacy and diet but not medical care
resources are determinants of health. They analyze an OECD cross section, in the main making remaining
life expectancy (RLE ) at ages 40 and 60 as of 1993 the dependent variable. The explanatory variables
include GDP, the consumption of tobacco and alcohol, and the consumption of animal fats. The authors
introduce lags of up to ten years (depending on data availability) to capture lifetime effects because
variations in most of these variables are unlikely to affect health right away. Rather than considering
total HCE only, they single out pharmaceutical consumption to find that this component matters far more
than does total HCE, which fails to have a significant effect on RLE. In their analysis of a cross section
for the year 2000, Miller and Frech III. (2004) complement their set of explanatory variables with obesity
(which proves significant with the expected sign) but continue to find that pharmaceutical consumption
importantly contributes to both RLE at age 40 and 60, both unadjusted and disability adjusted. Their
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specification is double logarithmic throughout, resulting in the estimation of constant elasticities which
necessarily imply decreasing marginal productivity of HCE as soon as HCE differs more strongly between
countries than does life expectancy (both relative to a benchmark, e.g. the United States).
Although this review may not be complete, the paucity of studies on the production of health is
striking. By way of contrast, there has been much more research into the determinants of HCE (to be
reviewed in section 2.2 below). Indeed, one might argue that the separate estimation of a production
function is not necessary, based on a duality argument. If individuals acted as perfect cost minimizers
in their production of health, the cost function [or an expenditure share function prior to normalization
of some price, cf. e.g. Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973)] contains all the information relating to
the production technology. However, the estimation of a separate production function of health can be
justified by the following arguments:
1. Beyond differentiating between medical and broadly economic explanatory variables, it is still not
clear which inputs belong in the health production function and whether their marginal productiv-
ities are stable across countries and across time.1
2. The health production technology is stochastic rather than deterministic. The deployment of both
medical and nonmedical inputs does not always prevent death, i.e. a health outcome that dif-
fers strongly from the one intended. This also implies that cost minimization is possible only on
expectation, with large deviations that serve to qualify the duality argument.
3. In the case of health, prices contained in the cost or expenditure share function are average prices
prior to insurance and public subsidies, while prices governing individual cost minimization are
marginal prices often close to zero and different from average prices.
4. Cost minimization is not a very credible hypothesis in health since decisions frequently are made
under the influence of physicians. A distortion results to the extent that physicians act as imperfect
agents of their patients. Moreover, HCE at the aggregate level may well reflect political institutions.
Conclusion 1 The estimation of a production function for health apart from a cost or expenditure (share)
function can be justified. The emerging consensus seems to be that at least some components of health
care inputs contribute to health with a lag and decreasing marginal effect.
1We owe this important point to one of the referees.
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2.2 The health care expenditure (HCE) function
Kleiman (1974) was one of the first to relate HCE to GDP using a cross-section of OECD country data.
He also included the population share of those aged 64+ but was unable to find a statistically significant
effect. Accordingly, Newhouse (1977) focused on the relationship between per capita GDP and HCE,
using a cross section of OECD countries. The computed income elasticity indicated that health care is a
luxury good. This finding was confirmed by Maxwell (1981) in a broad international survey.
In another regression analysis based on OECD data, Leu (1986) reintroduced the share of persons
aged less than 15 years and more than 65 years. However, his main innovation was the argument that
a greater share of public in total HCE facilitates budget maximization by bureaucrats, which can be
restrained by direct democracy or through central control, as in countries with a National Health Service.
These predictions were confirmed but failed to be replicated by later studies.
In their first attempt at identifying the feedback from remaining life expectancy RLE to HCE as part
of the Sisyphus syndrome, Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) found RLE at age 65+ to be even negatively related
to HCE, although without statistical significance. Public HCE turned out to be as much of a luxury good
as private HCE, with income elasticities far above unity. In a recent analysis of 70 year old Americans,
Lubitz, Cai, Kramarow, and Lentzner (2003) again fail to find a relationship between differences in
RLE (indicated by the presence of functional limitations) and projected future HCE. However, as will be
argued in 2.3 below, it is sufficient for such a relationship to hold in a subset of the population in order
to fuel the Sisyphus syndrome.
Collating information from three years to form an OECD panel data set for the first time, Gerdtham,
So¨gaard, Jo¨nsson and Andersson (1992) were able to introduce several new explanatory variables, such
as physician density, the share of inpatient to total HCE, as well as dummies for fee-for-service payment
and budgeting caps. In the present context, it is interesting to note that a 10 percent increase in the
share of inhabitants aged 64+ (relative to the 15 to 64 age group) was estimated to increase HCE by
almost 2 percent, in contradistinction to all studies cited so far.
Extending the period covered to 1970-1991, Gerdtham, Jo¨nsson, MacFarlan and Oxley (1998) intro-
duced a whole host of additional institutional variables. Among them, public reimbursement, capitation
of physicians, and patient-first payment with later reimbursement consistently are associated with lower
HCE. Tobacco consumption proves to be a significant predictor of higher HCE. With regard to the share of
the elderly population (75+ this time), there is no indication of a significant effect (negative if anything).
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A recent concern has been the possibility of spurious regression results due to nonstationarity of time
series, in particular HCE and GDP. Without directly addressing the nonstationarity issue, Barros (1998)
related the growth of HCE from 1960 to 1990 in OECD countries to the growth of GDP. The dummy
variables representing gatekeeping systems, public reimbursement, and integrated systems, respectively,
all prove insignificant once initial conditions are controlled for. Implied income elasticities range between
0.62 and 0.92. In their survey, Gerdtham and Jo¨nsson (2000) report very mixed results of studies applying
tests designed to detect nonstationarity. Since the emphasis of this contribution is not on the estimation of
the income elasticity of HCE, this route is not pursued. Rather detrending is sought by transforming the
dependent variable into the health share in GDP, resulting in the expenditure share function suggested
by duality (normalization by a price should be avoided in this context, see section 3). In addition, public
debate revolves much more about the share of GDP claimed by HCE rather than about HCE per se.
Conclusion 2 With one exception [Gerdtham et al. (1992)], there is no evidence to the effect that a high
share of individuals at or in retirement age leads to higher HCE. Other consistently significant regressors
are GDP and likely tobacco consumption.
2.3 A combined view: the Sisyphus syndrome
The theoretical starting point of this study is the fact that an individual not only has to manage his or
her health stock but also a stock of wealth and a stock of human capital (”wisdom”, see figure 1). The
dynamic optimization problem amounts to a series of portfolio choices determining the shares held in
the guise of wisdom, wealth, and health. Formal modeling has concentrated on the health and wealth
components of this portfolio (see Grossman (2000) for a comprehensive review). Certainly with regard
to the health component, this lifetime asset management is conditioned by environmental influences (e.g.
degree of industrialization, degree of urbanization). The left-hand portion of figure 1 thus shows the
production part of the Sisyphus model.
The right-hand side of figure 1 contains the derived demand part of the model. HCE is triggered by
a gap between desired and actual health stock and influenced by the institutional characteristics of the
health care system and relative prices. This implies that HCE is an endogenous determinant of health, a
fact that has not been duly recognized in those existing studies on the production of health that introduce
contemporaneous HCE as an exogenous explanatory variable. Next, the input of HCE increases (possibly
with a lag) actual health stock. If actual health stock remains below a critical level, death occurs, and
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the Sisyphus cycle comes to an end. If however the stock is sufficient to ensure survival, the individual
concerned can count on performing the cycle for a number of periods. The expected number of future
rounds defines his or her remaining life expectancy (RLE ).
Thus, the feedback from HCE to actual health stock determines the number of survivors who are able
to exert demand for health care and hence cause HCE. It is this feedback that is responsible for what
can be called the Sisyphus syndrome: Given that HCE is increased exogenously (e.g. by an expansion of
public health insurance coverage), more individuals survive the cycle. Moreover, these individuals have
a longer planning horizon thanks to an increased RLE. This also means that the optimal health stock
should have a higher value, which by itself makes the gap between desired and actual health stock larger,
thus calling for additional HCE again (see dashed arrow in figure 1). On the other hand, the direct effect
of HCE is to close the gap between desired and actual health stock. Therefore, the net effect of HCE on
the size of this gap remains an open issue, to be examined empirically.
This model motivates the creation of an explanatory variable that has not been introduced in previous
work. It will be called SISYPH because it reflects the potential strength of the Sisyphus syndrome.
SISYPH is the product of two factors: The first is RLE which shows the number of cycles an individual
of a given age expects to perform. However, if the relative number of such individuals in the population is
small, RLE by itself will have a small impact on the whole system. Therefore, RLE needs to be weighted
by the share of the population at that age as the second factor. Since individuals at retirement age cannot
be expected to contribute much to the financing of future HCE (creating a budgetary problem for policy
makers), the share of those aged 65 and older will be used in the following.
This description of the Sisyphus syndrome is still not complete, however. Some individuals, having
exerted demand for HCE on the expectation to survive for at least one more period, in fact die. Since
the gap between desired and actual health stock likely is large in this event, these individuals will have
driven up HCE in the current period while not contributing to the Sisyphus syndrome in the future.
Therefore, this confounding effect (discussed in section 1) must be taken into account in order to avoid
the risk of overestimating the dynamics of the syndrome. The share of deathbound individuals in a
population is given by the mortality rate, MORT. This constitutes another explanatory variable that has
been disregarded in published work on HCE.
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3 Specification, data base, and variables
The theoretical considerations laid out in the preceding section provide guidance as to the specification
of the relationships constituting the Sisyphus syndrome. Ideally, the hypothesis should be tested using
individual panel data; however, data availability dictates the use of aggregate indicators.
In the present situation, two issues need to be clarified. One is choosing the right lags. It turned out
that if both GDP and HCE have the same lag, multicollinearity becomes severe. Since the main focus
of this paper is on the effect of HCE, GDP is interpreted as a budget constraint rather than a lifestyle
variable in the following, suggesting a zero lag, while HCE, alcohol consumption, and calorie intake are
subjected to different lags. Preliminary estimates showed tobacco consumption to be insignificant, likely
because the data base contains too many gaps with respect to this variable. The lags tested for are 3,
5, and 10 years, causing the sample to vary both in terms of countries and years covered due to missing
values. A Hausman (1978) test is applied to select the preferred lag. It must be admitted of course that
any lags exceeding 10 years cannot be discovered in this way.
The other issue is the choice of a random effect vs. fixed effect specification. The advantage of the
random effects specification is that it preserves degrees of freedom; on the other hand, the country-specific
component of the error term has to be independent of the explanatory variables for consistency. Fixed
effects provide more information about the peculiarity of a country, but with 30 country-specific dummy
variables, multicollinearity quickly becomes a problem. One solution is to drop insignificant dummy
variables, which however entails a possible type II error each time. The regression strategy adopted here
therefore is to estimate both variants and to decide again on the basis of a Hausman (1978) test.
In view of the uncertainty surrounding the production of health, a specification permitting variable
marginal effects is retained for the first part of the Sisyphus model. This consists of equations for
remaining life expectancy (RLEF, RLEM ) at age 60, the population share of individuals aged 65 and
more (POP65, not available according to gender), and the mortality rate of the population as a whole
(MORT ). Subscripts i(countries) and t(year) are dropped for simplicity except for the error terms and
k = 3, 5, 10. In the case of random effects, one has,
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

RLEF
RLEM
POP65
MORT


=
α+ β1GDP + β2GDP2 + β3HCE−k + β4HCE2−k
+β5ALC−k + β6ALC2−k + β7CAL−k + β8CAL2−k
+υi + εit
(1)
Since these equations have the same explanatory variables, the β1...β8 denote vectors containing four
elements. The same holds true of υi and εit which describe a two-factor random effects specification,
with no correlation across the four equations assumed.
In the fixed effects alternative, the United States serves as a benchmark. The maximum of 29 dummy
variables, Di is not attained because of multicollinearity. Interestingly, the same 10 countries had to
be deleted from the four equations, yet despite this similarity between countries excluded, it proved
impossible to benefit from the similarity of those retained. Attempts to group countries with a common
dummy variable were not successful. The fixed effects equation thus is defined as follows,


RLEF
RLEM
POP65
MORT


=
α+ β1GDP + β2GDP2 + β3HCE−k + β4HCE2−k
+β5ALC−k + β6ALC2−k + β7CAL−k + β8CAL2−k + γ
′Di
+µit
(2)
The variables are defined as follows (see table 1 for a statistical description)with k = 3, 5, 10,
• RLEF : Remaining life expectancy of females at age 60
• RLEM : Remaining life expectancy of males at age 60
• POP65 : Population share of individuals aged 65 and more
• MORT : Mortality rate of the population, both genders, all ages, deceased per 100,000 inhabitants
• HCE/GDP : Share of health care expenditure in GDP, both nominal, in percent
• ALC−k: Alcohol consumption per capita, in litres, lagged k years; ALC2−k: ALC−k squared
• CAL−k: consumption of kilocalories per capita, lagged k years; CAL2−k: CAL−k squared
• GDP : GDP per capita, nominal but converted in US$ 1,000, GDP2 : GDP squared
11
• HCE−k: Total health care expenditure per capita, nominal but converted in US$ 1,000, lagged k
years; HCE2−k: HCE−k squared
• RPH : Price index of health care services relative to price index of GDP
• SISYPH : Predicted RLE, averaged over gender, multiplied by POP65 : [for details, see equation (3)].
The source of all these data is OECD (2001), a source known for several difficulties. One of them
is national differences with regard to the delimitation of the health care sector, resulting in different
baskets of services, another, the lack of comparability and precision of health care deflators. In view
of these difficulties, HCE was not deflated using national price indexes but by the exchange rate when
converting the figures into US$ (avoiding PPP indicators that may contain additional measurement error;
see Gerdtham and Jo¨nsson (1991)).
The variable SISYPH is constructed using predicted values from equation (1) or equation (2) as
follows,
̂SISY PH = (R̂LEF + R̂LEM)/2 ∗ P̂OP65 (3)
Finally, the derived demand part of the model is specified as an expenditure share, in keeping with
the duality considerations of section 2.1. Thus, the core equation for the health share in the GDP reads
as follows with the correct error term added and the dummy variables if needed according to the model
in use,
HCE/GDP = α′ + β′1GDP + β
′
2RPH + β
′
3M̂ORT (4)
+β′5 ̂SISY PH + error
Again, no correlation of error terms with those of equations (1) and (2) is admitted. In contradistinc-
tion to equations (1) and (2), these equations do not contain squared terms anymore to avoid extreme
multicollinearity. The variable ̂SISYPH already depends on all values of squared regressors (see eq. (1)
and eq. (2)), while for RPH there is no theoretical reason to enter a squared value when the dependent
variable is interpreted as a cost share equation.
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4 Estimation results
4.1 Production of health
As stated at the beginning of section 3, Hausman specification tests were performed to establish both a
preferred error structure and choice of lag. Fixed effects (FE) versus Random effects (RE) matched with
lags of (3, 5, 10) years makes for 6 elements that are pitted against each other, or 6!(6−2)! = 30 possibilities.
This amounts to a total of 15 combinations where one such combination is to take FE as the maintained
hypothesis and to test the RE against it; the other combination in the pair is to take the RE as the
maintained hypothesis and to proceed conversely.
It turns out that in all of the 15 two-way comparisons, the FE alternative never dominates without
an exception with at least one lag in at least one equation making up (1) or (2). By way of contrast,
the RE specification dominates without exception in three of these 15 paired tests, and in an additional
three with no more than one exception. On the other hand when the Hausman test is applied to the
three lags, (3, 5, 10) dominate in (6, 2, 7) comparisons. Both lags 3 and 10 have five exceptions, but in
lag 3, they are multiple in one case. Therefore, the evidence suggests a random effects specification with
a lag of k = 10 years.
4.1.1 The influence of HCE on Remaining Life Expectancy (RLE)
In the original article by Zweifel and Ferrari (1992), remaining life expectancy of males and females at
ages 40 and 65 was distinguished, the main motivation being the quadrupling of observations. However,
the differences between ages 40 and 60 in the present work proved minimal when the critical values were
computed where additional HCE does not affect RLE at the margin. As the policy focus is on individuals
approaching retirement, only gender-specific results for age 60 are shown in table 2.
Contemporaneous GDP (in US$) is associated with higher RLE in both sexes (with females possibly
affected more strongly), confirming results found by Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) as well as Frech III.
and Miller (1999). A decreasing marginal effect of income cannot be excluded. The earlier study by
Zweifel and Ferrari is also confirmed in that HCE−10 results in higher current RLE for both sexes.
Since the squared explanatory variable proves highly significant, a critical value can be calculated beyond
which additional lagged HCE is counter-productive (flat-of-the curve medicine). Among women, this is
approximately US$ 1,800, among men, US$ 2,060, compared to a mean value of US$ 1,375 in 2000. With
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regard to the lifestyle indicators, (lagged) consumption of calories and tobacco do not show an influence,
whereas alcohol consumption benefits RLE at low levels. Similar findings would have been attained with
a lag of 3 rather than 10 years.
4.1.2 Influence of HCE on 65+ Population Share
In order to determine the pressure of individuals faced with a given RLE, their population share must
be accounted for, resulting in the variable SISYPH [defined in equation (3)]. However, the population
share of individuals 65 and older might depend on (lagged) HCE.
The results of table 3 do suggest endogeneity of POP65, but not with regard to HCE−10. Specifically,
higher GDP goes along with a higher share of aged people (up to some US$ 28,750), whereas HCE does
not have a discernible effect. The first of these two statements holds also for a lag in HCE, CAL and
ALC of 3 years; however, HCE−3 would have attained statistical significance. In the life style domain,
alcohol consumption clearly serves to increase this share, but with decreasing effect at the margin. The
remaining lifestyle variables do not contribute to the determination of POP65, regardless of the choice of
lag.
4.1.3 Influences on Mortality
Since mortality is not a core variable of the Sisyphus syndrome but mainly serves to take the surge in
HCE towards the end of human life into account, no gender-specific regressions are presented in table 5.
In accordance with early research on the United States [Auster et al. (1969)], higher contemporaneous
GDP might possibly decrease mortality at the high end of the sample (beyond US$ 35,000; the same
holds for HCE−10, beyond US$ 1,490, driving home the argument made above that mortality occurs
sooner or later. None of the lifestyle variables are statistically significant. All of these statements prove
robust to a lag of 3 rather than 10 years.
4.2 Explaining the Health Share in the GDP
In keeping with arguments proffered in section 2.1, the dependent variable here is HCE/GDP. In the
earlier estimation of the Sisyphus syndrome by Zweifel and Ferrari (1992), an attempt was made to
distinguish between private and public HCE to see whether the feedback from RLE to HCE is particularly
marked in the public domain. However, the published literature does not make this distinction because
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the assignment of total HCE to these two components is far from perfect in many countries, resulting
in measurement error (we thank Pedro Pito Barros, Lisbon, for calling our attention to this). With
HCE/GDP being the dependent variable, resulting in a filtering out of common trends, measurement
errors are expected to play a more important role to begin with. Therefore, the distinction between the
private and public components is not made here. All endogenous variables estimated in section 4.1 enter
with their predicted values, using a lag of 10 years (except for GDP).
Again, the fixed-effects (FE) and the random-effects (RE) specification is based on a Hausman test.
This time, FE dominates. This divergence from the health production part of the model is puzzling at first
sight. However the production of health depends largely on internationally available medical technology,
whereas HCE (as argued at the end of section 2.1), is also determined by institutional factors that are
not so well presented exclusively by an error component whose autocorrelation coefficient is an average
over all countries. Indeed, Canada and Germany differ comparatively little (some two percentage points)
from the United States (the reference country), Australia, Austria, Portugal and Switzerland form an
intermediate group (around three percentage points), while Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom
are estimated to lie four percentage points below the United States, ceteris paribus. Other countries can
not be assigned to one of the groups, either because they fall in between or because they had to be
dropped due to multicollinearity (15 cases).
In principle, there could be a problem in particular with the lower bound being zero for HCEGDP . However,
calculations using extreme value combinations of explanatory variables inducing low predicted values of
HCE
GDP still produced estimates well within the positive range. This result is due mainly due to the small
effect of GDP on the health share. In spite of the political debate on its rise in major industrial countries,
no significant effect of GDP can be discerned. This means that the estimated income elasticity of HCE
is 1 (apart from the Sisyphus effect, see below).2 This is lower than most elasticities in Gerdtham et al.
(1992) but higher than the estimates presented in Gerdtham et al. (1998). As to the role of relative price
RPH, the theoretical prediction would be that both private and public decision makers tend to substitute
health goods for other commodities (aggregated in the GDP) when RPH is high. The positive coefficient
of RPH indicates that the implied price elasticity is slightly below one.3 Another prediction, already of
2The income elasticity of HCE can be calculated as follows. Using HCE ≡ (HCE/GDP ) ∗GDP, one obtains ∂HCE
∂GDP
=
∂(HCE/GDP )
∂GDP
∗ GDP + HCE
GDP
. The first derivative equals β′1 from equation (4); therefore, the elasticity is given by
e(HCE,GDP ) = β′1 ∗ (GDP )
2/HCE + 1 = 1 since β′1 is not significantly different from zero (see table 5).
3Since HCE/GDP is formed using nominal figures, it contains RPH. Noting that RPH = PH/PGDP (the ratio of the
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relevance to the Sisyphus syndrome, is not confirmed, viz. that a higher mortality rate in a given year
means a greater number of individuals in their last year of life, causing HCE to be high in that year.
The coefficient of M̂ORT is positive but nonsignificant.
Of course, the variable of crucial interest is ̂SISY PH, the remaining life expectancy at age 60 weighted
by the share of individuals close to retirement age. It has a highly significant coefficient, possibly raising
the scepter of an aging population that keeps the spiral in motion indefinitely.
Conclusion 3 The reestimation of the feedback relationship, linking (population share-weighted) remain-
ing life expectancy to the health share in the GDP, yields preliminary statistical evidence of a Sisyphus
syndrome.
4.3 Assessing the strength of the Sisyphus syndrome
The estimates presented in the previous section allow to conclude that there is some preliminary evidence
that between 1970 and 2000 a Sisyphus syndrome may have existed. The open question remains of
whether the syndrome may be a phenomenon of sufficient importance to merit attention for some or all
OECD countries. This calls for the evaluation of the partial derivative ∂HCE/∂HCE−10: If in a given
year during the period of observation, HCE was stepped up, to what extent will later HCE be higher
as a consequence of the syndrome (the lag being 10 years as established through specification tests)? If
this derivative should exceed unity, this would constitute evidence of a locally explosive cycle; a globally
explosive situation can be excluded because all derivatives to be evaluated have critical values where they
become zero (linear and quadratic regressors have opposite signs in tables 2 to 4). The identity
HCE ≡ (HCE/GDP ) ∗GDP (5)
may be used to obtain equation (6), establishing the link between HCE/GDP and HCE−10:
∂HCE
∂HCE−10
=
=
∂((HCE/GDP ) ∗GDP )
∂HCE−10
health to the GDP deflator), and using lower case symbols for real quantities, one has (hce/gdp)∗RPH = ...β′2 ∗RPH+ ...,
or hce ∗ RPH = ...β′2 ∗ RPH ∗ gdp. Differentiating with respect to RPH, one obtains, hce ∗ (1 + η) = β
′
2 ∗ gdp, where η is
the elasticity of the demand for health care (hce) w.r.t. RPH. Solving for η, one obtains η = β′2 ∗ (HCE/GDP )
−1
− 1.
Evaluated at the sample means, this amounts to −0.99.
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=
∂(HCE/GDP )
∂HCE−10
∗GDP + (HCE/GDP ) ∗
∂GDP
∂HCE−10
=
∂(HCE/GDP )
∂HCE−10
∗GDP (6)
since ∂GDP/∂HCE−10 can be assumed to be zero. Now HCE−10 influences current HCE through
SISYPH, which is designed to capture the impact of population-weighted RLE on the demand for health
care and hence HCE [see equation (3) again]. Implicit differentiation then yields,
∂(HCE/GDP )
∂HCE−10
=
=
∂(HCE/GDP )
∂SISY PH
∗
∂SISY PH
∂HCE−10
=
∂(HCE/GDP )
∂SISY PH
1
2
[
∂RLEF
∂HCE−10
+
∂RLEM
∂HCE−10
]
∗ POP65, (7)
since ∂POP65/∂HCE−10 may be set to zero, according to table 4. Substituting (7) into (6) and noting
that HCE−10 is measured in thousands of US$ and therefore needs to be rescaled, one obtains,
∂HCE
∂HCE−10
=
=
1
2︸︷︷︸∗
∂(HCE/GDP )
∂SISY PH︸ ︷︷ ︸∗

 ∂RLEF
∂HCE−10
+
∂RLEM
∂HCE−10︸ ︷︷ ︸

∗POP65︸ ︷︷ ︸∗GDP︸ ︷︷ ︸∗ 11000︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0.5 ∗ 0.069 ∗ [1.46 + 1.51] ∗ 13.60 ∗15.76∗0.001 ≈ 0.021
(8)
The derivatives come from tables 2 and 5 but have to be evaluated at specific values because the regressors
of table 2 appear not only in linear but also in quadratic form. Neglecting estimated coefficients that
are nonsignificant and inserting overall sample means one concludes that US$ 1 of HCE−10 induces
some US$ 0.02 of current HCE due to the dynamics of the Sisyphus syndrome. Assuming exponential
decay, one could say that 68 percent of a one-time shock to HCE is carried over to the following year
(0.6810 ≈ 0.02). This is far enough from unity to suggest that the cycle is not explosive.
Conclusion 4 The Sisyphus syndrome seems to have been of some importance during the observation
period, with an estimated 68 percent of one US$ of additional HCE carrying over to the following year,
which points to stability.
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5 Summary and conclusions
This contribution started from the notion that the production of health and the determination of health
care expenditure (HCE ) should be analyzed jointly. Short of adopting the duality argument to the effect
that estimating either a production function or an expenditure (share) function is sufficient, the two
links are seen as constituting a dynamic feedback relationship. Once HCE is stepped up exogenously, it
may well (with a lag) increase remaining life expectancy and hence the planning horizon of an individual
considering an investment in health. This should increase demand for HCE, resulting in a feedback that
constitutes the Sisyphus syndrome. The macroeconomic importance of this syndrome crucially depends
on the remaining life expectancy of those who are at retirement age, beyond which they contribute
little to the financing of HCE. These considerations call for the construction of the variable ̂SISY PH,
which is the remaining life expectancy at age 60 weighted by the share of individuals aged 65+, the age
discrepancy caused by data availability.
From 1970 to 2000 and among OECD countries, there is confirming evidence for both links. Prior
HCE is positively related both to remaining life expectancy at age 60 and the population share of the
aged 65+ and hence the ̂SISY PH variable. In its turn, ̂SISY PH proves to be a significant determinant
of the health share in GDP . An initial HCE increase of US$ 1 is estimated to still result in US$ 0.02 a
decade later as a result of the Sisyphus syndrome. Assuming exponential decay, 68 percent of a one-time
shock thus are estimated to carry over to the following year. Since the income elasticity of HCE is
estimated to be one ceteris paribus, much of the observed increase of the health share in the GDP can
be traced to the Sisyphus syndrome.
However, one might argue that a Sisyphus syndrome does not really exist. For one, GDP could have
been interpreted as a lifestyle variable rather than indicating a budget constraint. This would have called
for the introduction of lags for this variable, which could have pointed to delayed adjustments of HCEGDP
even exceeding the 30 years covered by the present sample. In addition, in view of the high degree of
multicollinearity between HCE and GDP regardless of the lag selected (simple correlation coefficients
always in excess of 0.8538), the estimated effects of lagged HCE on remaining life expectancy likely
would have dropped and possibly could have lost significance. In that event, there would be no evidence
of HCE contributing to the growth of a population segment that has a particular interest in the increased
provision of health care services in a later period. Finally some OECD countries have missing values more
often than others, which may introduce a selection bias to the extent that those not reporting have less
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problems with rising HCE (which are interpreted as a reflection of the Sisyphus syndrome in this paper).
The countries more consistently represented in the sample might therefore introduce a bias in favor of
finding such a syndrome.
While such arguments cannot be rejected out of hand, there are at least two considerations that speak
against these. The first is that the hypothesis of a Sisyphus syndrome as a dynamic relationship puts
emphasis on lags. Specifically, in previous research on the production of health, contemporaneous HCE
was not found to consistently lower mortality rates or increase longevity. However, when introducing a lag
of ten years, both Zweifel and Ferrari (1992) and Frech III. and Miller (1999) were able to relate remaining
life expectancy to previous HCE, and this lag is replicated in the present study. Second, the link between
production and factor demand theory suggests use of an expenditure share function (HCE/GDP) which
is much less influenced by a time trend than HCE itself. And it is with such a detrended dependent
variable that ̂SISY PH, whose construction is entirely motivated by the maintained hypothesis, proves
highly significant.
On the whole, the evidence suggests that a Sisyphus syndrome may have been operative in the OECD
countries until the end of the past century. Although its dynamics are far from explosive, it mirrors the
concern of policy makers that the decision to increase health care expenditure could have some similarity
with the proverbial ride on a tiger.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables, 1970-2000
Overall 1970 1970 2000 2000
mean mina maxa mina maxa
RLEF 21.973 16.0 20.9 18.2 22.9
RLEM 17.678 14.1 17.8 16 21.4
POP65 13.369 3.1 14.1 5.3b 17.8b
MORT 845.888 852.3 1328.5 670.9b 1173.5b
HCE/GDP 7.571 2.584 6.951 5.412b 12.865b
RPH 89.820 54.8 121.6 98.6 108.1
GDP 15.762 0.272 5.027 2.974 42.315
HCE−10 0.522 0.006 0.144 0.082 2.820
ALC−10 11.018 0.9 23.7 1.4 16.6
CAL−10 3.048 2.096 3.467 1.870 3.705
̂SY SIPHc 272.165
N 233
aThe minima and maxima for 1970 and 2000 were taken over the whole sample available
even if the observation was not used in the estimation of table 5.
b1999
cEstimated variable, see equation 3 in the text. Values for 1970 and 2000 not available
due to missing values of either P̂OP65, R̂LEF or R̂LEM .
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Table 2: Remaining life expectancy at age 60, 1970-2000
Females Males
RLEa Coefficient z P > z Coefficient z P > z
GDP 0.122 5.43 0.000 0.077 4.90 0.000
GDP2 -0.002 -3.91 0.000 -0.001 -2.95 0.003
HCE−10 2.045 4.82 0.000 2.022 4.49 0.000
HCE2−10 -0.565 -3.60 0.000 -0.491 -2.95 0.003
ALC−10 -0.043 -0.70 0.484 0.022 0.23 0.822
ALC2−10 0.002 1.02 0.307 -0.001 -0.22 0.827
CAL−10 0.786 0.65 0.515 -0.723 -1.08 0.281
CAL2−10 -0.083 -0.50 0.614 -0.135 1.53 0.125
constant 18.572 9.11 0.000 16.883 13.94 0.000
Wald χ2(8): 210.64 338.33
Prob > χ2: 0.0000 0.0000
1− var(εit)var(RLEF ) : 0.601 0.559
N 303 303
aNote: Included in this equation are (frequency): Australia(21), Austria(29), Belgium(22),
Canada(12), Denmark(18), Finland(17), Germany(13), Ireland(15), Japan(2), Luxem-
bourg(4), New Zealand(19), Norway(29), Portugal(15), Spain(13), Sweden(16), Switzer-
land(25), United Kingdom(18), U.S.A.(15)
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Table 3: Share of individuals aged 65 and older, 1970-2000
POP65a Coefficient z P > z
GDP 0.115 6.64 0.000
GDP2 -0.002 -4.67 0.000
HCE−10 0.626 1.35 0.177
HCE2−10 -0.170 -0.97 0.333
ALC−10 0.174 2.75 0.006
ALC2−10 -0.005 -2.89 0.004
CAL−10 -0.274 -1.40 0.161
CAL2−10 0.050 1.80 0.071
constant 11.270 14.15 0.000
Wald χ2(8): 332.63
Prob > χ2: 0.0000
1− var(εit)var(POP65) : 0.190
N 394
aNote: Included in this equation are (frequency): Australia(21), Austria(30), Belgium(30),
Canada(30), Denmark(19), Finland(19), France(2), Germany(14), Ireland(30), Japan(2),
Luxembourg(12), Netherlands(2), New Zealand(20), Norway(30), Portugal(20), Spain(29),
Sweden(17), Switzerland(26), United Kingdom(25), U.S.A.(16)
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Table 4: Influences on mortality, 1970-2000
MORT a Coefficient z P > z
GDP -8.319 -3.46 0.001
GDP2 0.118 1.84 0.065
HCE−10 -203.305 -5.68 0.000
HCE2−10 68.349 4.02 0.000
ALC−10 -16.843 -1.85 0.065
ALC2−10 0.452 1.78 0.075
CAL−10 86.145 1.32 0.188
CAL2−10 -15.036 -1.78 0.075
constant 1025.007 8.42 0.000
Wald χ2(8): 431.15
Prob > χ2: 0.0000
1− var(εit)var(MORT ) : 0.574
N 351
aNote: Included in this equation are (frequency): Australia(19), Austria(30), Belgium(26),
Canada(28), Denmark(16), Finland(16), Germany(13), Ireland(27), Luxembourg(10), New
Zealand(19), Norway(28), Portugal(19), Spain(27), Sweden(14), Switzerland(21), United
Kingdom(24), U.S.A.(14)
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Table 5: Health share in the GDP, 1970-2000
HCE/GDP na Coefficient z P > z
Dum Australia 19 -3.057 -7.90 0.000
Dum Austria 26 -3.167 -8.62 0.000
Dum Canada 12 -2.179 -5.35 0.000
Dum Denmark 16 -2.466 -6.26 0.000
Dum Finland 15 -3.238 -8.21 0.000
Dum Germany 11 -1.640 -3.89 0.000
Dum Ireland 15 -2.706 -6.27 0.000
Dum Luxembourg 4 -4.375 -8.45 0.000
Dum NewZealand 16 -3.679 -9.29 0.000
Dum Norway 28 -3.515 -9.64 0.000
Dum Portugal 8 -2.890 -6.33 0.000
Dum Spain 10 -4.001 -8.83 0.000
Dum Switzerland 21 -3.081 -8.14 0.000
Dum UnitedKingdom 17 -3.906 -9.89 0.000
GDP -0.020 -1.13 0.260
RPH 0.012 2.03 0.042
M̂ORT 0.010 1.72 0.085
̂SISY PH 0.069 2.98 0.003
constant -18.092 -1.59 0.112
Wald χ2(18): 524.26
Prob > χ2: 0.0000
1− var(εit)var(HCE/GDP ) : 0.847
N 232
aNote that n is the number of country-specific observations, with the benchmark U.S.A.
being in the sample 14 times.
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Figure 1: Sisyphus Syndrome
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